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ABSTRACT 
The CK theory of design created by Hatchuel and Weil has 
raised interest and controversies both in the academic 
community and among practitioners.  
After presenting the scope and focus of CK theory, and the 
contributions claimed for it by its creators, we compare it to 
concepts and models more commonly used in traditional design 
approaches. It can be noticed that important concepts are 
ignored by CK theory, even if some of them are integrated into 
the research programs of Hatchuel, Weil, and Le Masson. This 
initial analysis demonstrates that even in its scope, CK theory 
appears incomplete for engineering design and does not 
consider important dimensions of the validity of the research 
program as claimed.  
Then we analyze the foundations and hypotheses of CK theory 
from a critical viewpoint. Some suggestions for its improvement 
are made. Additionally, the ability of CK theory both to 
effectively assist and direct the creative process and, moreover, 
to organize the complete design and innovation processes is 
questioned. 
Finally, we draw conclusions about the ambitious program and 
results claimed by the creators of CK theory. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
During the past two decades, the growing economic problems 
faced by traditional industries in Europe and the USA have been 
seen as a result of the emergence of new economic powers, 
mainly located in Asia. This evolution has emphasized the 
importance of innovations as a key parameter for the survival 
and renewal of industry in these areas much more than was 
previously the case. 
At the same time research, initiated by S. Kline and N. 
Rosenberg in their Chain-Linked Model (1986), has shown that 
in order to improve the ability to innovate, we must take the 
design process into account. This hypothesis gradually led to 
the development of design theories that were able to explain 
and direct innovation processes and strategies. CK theory is one 
of the attempts to address this challenging scientific issue. The 
present article aims at analyzing this theory and is organized in 
the following manner.  
First, we present the scope and focus of CK theory. 
Second, we develop a comparative study of the concepts used in 
CK theory and some existing concepts and tools that have been 
developed before in design science. This parts shows that CK 
theory is not trying to integrate most of the existing concepts 
but instead to develop a different approach that has a great deal 
in common with inferential design theory. Several concepts 
used in CK theory have been previously introduced in the 
inferential theory of learning and in inferential design theory, 
where the concept of concept and knowledge are both used.  
Third, we develop a critical analysis of CK theory, showing that 
its real operability scope in the design context is probably 
limited compared to the claims made by the creators of the 
theory. In the last section, the paper draws conclusions about 
the new developments provided by the theory and also 
summarizes the limitations highlighted by the authors of this 
article compared with the claims of the creators of CK theory. 
2 A SURVEY OF CK THEORY AND ITS CLAIMS 
The present section aims at presenting the key concepts of CK 
theory. Before presenting them, it is, however, necessary to 
understand the purpose and scope of such a theory. 
2.1 Purpose and scope of CK theory: 
Le Masson, Weil, and Hatchuel position their work in the RID 
model, where R stands for Research, I for Innovation, and D for 
Development [2].   
According to them, D is defined as a controlled process which 
activates existing competences and knowledge in order to 
specify an artefact which should satisfy some well-known 
objectives. From such a viewpoint, the development process 
aims at instantiating parameters, these parameters being fixed 
ex ante by a generative model. Thus, the extent to which D can 
support the exploration of new alternatives is not independent 
of the generative model on which the development process is 
based. 
Research is defined as a process which provides the 
scientifically controlled knowledge needed for D.  
However, neither R nor D can initiate a design process 
concerning ill-defined objects. This is precisely the goal of the 
function I, which is dedicated to the co-evolution of 
competencies and products. 
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If we accept such a viewpoint, the question arises of knowing 
how to organize I.  
In order to answer this question they develop a model of 
collective action on I based on an innovative design reasoning 
approach. They suggest that CK is the original formalism of the 
design reasoning used in I. 
Their research program aims at: 
- defining a design reasoning based on functional logic (the 
concept of functional logic is presented as leading to an 
interpretation using the concept of a function), the 
expandability of the knowledge, and the expandability of the 
propositions;  
- establishing the conditions allowing such a type of 
reasoning;  
- defining the main operators allowing such a type of 
reasoning, and 
- deriving more general consequences from the theory 
2.2 Concepts and operators of CK theory: 
The creators of the theory define design as follows [11] (p.124): 
“assuming a space of concepts C and a space of knowledge K, 
we define Design as the process by which a concept generates 
other concepts or is transformed into knowledge, i.e. 
propositions in K.”  
Knowledge is a proposal that has a logical status for the 
designer or for the customer (True or False in binary logic, but 
the type of logic does not really matter). On the other hand, a 
concept is defined as a notion or proposition without any logical 
status: “It cannot be said from a concept whether the concept by 
itself is right or wrong” [3] (pp. 123-124). “Space C is the space 
of concepts. Concepts are undecidable propositions in K 
(neither true nor false in K) about some partially unknown 
objects x.” [3].  
According to the authors, design reasoning can be theorized as 
the co-evolution of these two spaces, C and K. What they call 
the "capacity of expansion" is the ability of the design process 
to generate innovation via reasoning which begins with a 
disjunction KC, which creates a concept and ends with a 
conjunction CK, which transforms a concept into knowledge. 
They define the operators (C-C, C-K, K-C, C-C) which 
organize the co-evolution of the C and K spaces in the 
following manner [2]:  
KC: This operator adds or subtracts to concepts in C some 
properties coming from K. It creates “disjunctions” when it 
transforms elements from K into a concept. This also 
corresponds to what is usually called the “generation of 
alternatives”. However, concepts are not alternatives but 
potential “seeds” for alternatives. This operator expands the 
space C with elements coming from K: concepts cannot be 
imagined without knowledge. They call this the K-relativity of 
a design process [3].  
CK: This operator searches for properties in K that could be 
added or subtracted to reach propositions with a logical status; 
it creates conjunctions which could be accepted as “finished 
designs” – when true. Practically, it corresponds to validation 
tools or methods in traditional design: consulting an expert, 
doing a test, an experimental plan, a prototype, and a mock-up 
are common examples of CK operators.  
A design solution is precisely what Hatchuel and Weil call a 
“conjunction”. They have reached a concept which is 
characterized by a sufficient number of propositions that can be 
established as true or false in K [11]. 
KK: This operator allows a knowledge space to be capable of 
self- expansion. This operator corresponds to an expansion of 
the knowledge space obtained by deduction and/or 
experimentation. This operator is not fundamental for the 
design process. This operator and the following one correspond 
to the exploration of the design space. 
CC: Finally, the operator CC explains the expansion of the 
concept space. The expansion of C (the addition of a new 
concept) can be performed by removing a property from a 
concept; it is then an inclusion. Adding a property otherwise 
constitutes a partition. The partition is restrictive if the property 
already belongs to the concept. It is expansive when a new 
property is added to the concept.  
These mechanisms make the C space a tree structure (the 
partitions correspond to the creation of new "branches", 
expansions to their pruning). "We can only create new concepts 
(new sets) by adding or subtracting new properties to the initial 
concept.” [1] 
As a summary, for the creators of CK, the mechanism of 
expansive partition is the elementary motor of design (contrary 
to problem-solving approaches). The mechanism of expansive 
partitions therefore requires two initial conditions: 
- the set to be partitioned is not completely specified. This set 
is expandable; 
- the partition is activated using external knowledge, outside 
of the CK space. 
The creators of CK consider that their model “clarifies the 
oddness of design reasoning. There is no design if there are no 
concepts: concepts are candidates to be transformed into 
propositions of K but are not themselves elements of K,” and 
they justify this definition by developing an argument already 
developed before by Tomiyama and Yoshikawa in their General 
Design Theory [23]: “If the proposition is true in K it would 
mean that this entity already exists and that we know all that we 
need about it (including its feasibility) to assess the required 
properties. Design would immediately stop!” [11]. They claim 
that a false proposition in K will also result in the design being 
stopped. 
2.3 Claims 
CK appears as a very high-level theory with both fundamental 
mathematical roots and applicative consequences. The major 
claims of the creators of CK are: 
1. the preservation of the consistency of definitions in K can 
be explained by Forcing [8], a method of Set theory 
developed by Paul Cohen in 1963 for the “invention” of 
new sets; 
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2. the links between design and knowledge are clarified and 
draw fundamental interdependences. Without concepts, no 
novel knowledge is possible and without prior knowledge, 
no concepts can emerge, otherwise how can disjunctions be 
made? There is no autonomous theory of knowledge; 
3. CK design theory allows two extreme forms of innovation 
to be distinguished: conceptual innovations (great 
conceptual expansion without any significant expansion of 
knowledge) and the erroneously named applicative 
innovation (a great expansion of knowledge without much 
conceptual expansion). Hatchuel and Weil agree with the 
viewpoint of Kryssanov, Tamaki, and Kitamura [14], who 
some years earlier claimed that a "theory of creativity is a 
theory of transformation of the space of concepts" [21]. 
4. CK theory is a tool to direct and organize the innovation 
process [2] [4] [8]. Its creators claim that they can combine 
the possibility of controlling the innovation process and at 
the same time developing creativity by creating new islands 
of knowledge in the exploration phase of K.   
3 A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF CK THEORY  
This section aims at discussing the foundations of the CK 
theory of design. We shall consider successively the notion of 
concept and knowledge, the structure of the two spaces, and, 
finally, the operators of CK theory.  
3.1 Concepts and knowledge? 
The words "concepts" and "knowledge" are widely used in CK 
theory but also in other fields. At this point providing a greater 
insight into the understanding of the term "concept" is 
necessary. The notion of a concept is considered in two main 
ways in contemporary philosophical theories: as a mental 
representation and as an abstract object (Frege). 
A concept is considered as a unit of cognitive meaning, an 
abstract idea, or a mental symbol, sometimes defined as "a unit 
of knowledge". 
In modern philosophy a concept is therefore associated closely 
with knowledge and separating them appears artificial. From 
this perspective the partition between concepts and knowledge 
does not seem to work in modern philosophy: concepts and 
knowledge seem to be more dependent than they are presented 
as being in CK theory.  
The definition that CK theory gives of "concepts" is more 
restrictive. This is a simple description of a set of properties a 
future product could have. Nevertheless, CK theory also claims 
that concepts are K-relative. To go further, it will be necessary 
to question the acceptance of the term "properties". This point 
is discussed later.  
Analyzing knowledge requires, to start with, the questioning of 
the building blocks that constitute knowledge. For CK, 
knowledge is a proposal with a defined logical status. K is the established knowledge 
available to a designer (or a design team) [4]. However, in design, the literature on 
knowledge most commonly considers knowledge as elements 
that an agent (whether individual or collective, human or 
artificial) considers true, and this element gives him a capacity 
for action. It may be useful to draw distinctions between data, 
information, knowledge, and competence [22]. Data are 
elements that can be put onto a physical or virtual support 
(paper, mass storage data device…). They can be duplicated 
and shared. Data become information when the context is 
explicit and information becomes knowledge when the agent 
knows how to interpret it. Knowledge contributes to a 
competence when it is used for an action. All these processes 
(making the context explicit, interpret, use) vary from one 
individual to another and depend on the situation (situated 
action). They can also lead to cognitive shifts in distributed 
cognition, but distributed cognition is not considered in CK 
theory. As for the term "concept", CK theory gives a restrictive 
definition of the notion of knowledge. Fundamentally, we do 
not know where the knowledge that makes up the K space come 
from, and there is no discussion focusing on the possible 
contributions of the participants in the design process from their 
own knowledge, nor of the conditions for the mobilization of 
this knowledge. The creators of CK theory simply indicate that 
"when knowledge is lacking, the logic of the design space can 
create it in a controlled manner" [2] (p. 293)… but how is this 
done, and by whom? 
This is an aspect which, like many others, remains unclarified 
and fuzzy in the theory.  
3.2 Structures of the two spaces. 
The hypothesis concerning the structure of the two spaces, C 
and K, must be discussed. Little has been said about a possible 
taxonomy of knowledge or concepts. However, these 
discussions are very much present in design, where 
classifications organized in different dimensions exist, such as 
product/process, or declarative/procedural.  Moreover, setting 
taxonomies goes hand in hand with questioning the links 
between the different elements considered, and can be highly 
productive. This is an aspect not considered by CK theory. 
Structure of K 
The authors of this article are struck by the (lack of) structure of 
the K space. Propositions in the knowledge space are assumed 
to be relatively independent. The K space seems to have no 
specific structure, or, if a structure exists, it has no direct 
influence on the design process itself. However, this assumption 
for the K space does not preserve and process connections 
between K. The theory presents one type of connections 
between elements of K via the operator K→K. If the design 
thinking involves deductive reasoning at one time or another, 
then the knowledge is not independent and the organization of 
knowledge in the form of a father-child structure is needed in 
order to represent the design thinking.  
The construction of concepts is made by the agglomeration of 
knowledge, and results (when successful) in new knowledge 
which is an agglomeration of existing knowledge. The path 
selected might be important and requires a real structure to be 
provided for C and K.  
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Nevertheless, we did not find any references to a taxonomy 
of knowledge in CK. There is a reference about Forcing [8], a 
technique of set theory that is supposed to justify the amazing 
capability of CK to control innovation and, at the same time, to 
boost creativity. Forcing is presented by the creators of CK as a 
justification of the structure of K. They do not refer to the term 
"taxonomy" but present their structure as a kind of “growing 
archipelago by the adjunction of new objects or by new 
properties linking these objects” [4]. This structure shares some 
properties with the definition of ontology in information 
science. Indeed, in computer science and information science, 
an ontology is a formal representation of a set of fundamental 
concepts within a domain and the relationships between those 
concepts. It is used to reason about the properties of that 
domain, and may be used to define the domain. An ontology 
organizes the domain by fundamental concepts. In this respect 
the knowledge space in CK theory is not structured in the form 
of an ontology. Hatchuel and Weil present the potential analogy 
between the theory of forcing and CK theory as a way to 
preserve meaning when new objects are created during a design 
process. This, for them, is the theoretical proof of the possibility 
of preserving the consistency of definitions in K, but this is not 
enough to structure K.    
Structure of C 
The hierarchical structure of concepts is now questioned. A 
fundamental feature of C is that C is not multidimensional. 
Concepts are constructed by additions or deletions of 
"properties" to an existing concept, without the nature(s) of 
these "properties" being discussed. Nevertheless, many 
developments in the understanding of design activity consider 
the existence of characteristics coming from several areas. This 
is typically the case for the functions, structures, and behavior, 
and possibly also the need and motivation for the product. This 
is also the case with the now classical hierarchy of product 
concepts: architecture, functions, constraints, organs… A 
possible source of ambiguity can arise here. For instance, an 
example of a concept as "something having the properties (or 
functions) F1, F2, F3,…” is given on page 5 in [2], whereas, on 
page 6, a requirement list and a proposal made by a designer 
can both be considered as concepts: "In our framework the 
formulation of the “requirements” is a first concept formulation 
which is expanded by the designer in a second concept that is 
called the proposal." Unfortunately, we commonly consider a 
set of functions, a requirement list, and a proposal as different 
objects, and these differences have been proven to be 
productive. They are not considered in any way by CK theory; 
this is one aspect that might diminish the prescriptive aspect and 
the real impact of CK theory in real design situations. 
More structuring could be productive 
The rejection of a taxonomy raises questions. It is, for instance, 
impossible to discuss the concepts of co-evolution or data 
structures. Moreover, the reasoning cannot be fully qualified. 
Thus, it is significant that, for example, the concept of 
functionality is not present elsewhere than in the introductions 
to the theory. 
The objective of design is linking/building links between 
elements of different natures. Some elements are targets (the 
"What For"), while others are considered as answers (the 
"How"). The lack of classification according to a grid-type "For 
What/How" does not allow complete questioning about the 
nature of a concept. Evidently, during design, it becomes 
necessary to consider propositions with a non-defined logical 
status, but these propositions can be of different types: "What 
for", "How", or, more commonly, any mix between these 
questions. Design can start with a complete list of requirements, 
as well as with very little documentation; it can also begin with 
an objective, with a "problem" (e.g. simply the impossibility of 
reaching some given objectives with the answers previously 
envisaged), or with the feeling that "something must be done".  
In this respect the structure of C in CK theory does not provide 
an answer to the properties needed in practical design 
situations.  
3.3 Design reasoning 
We shall now focus on the different operators involved in the 
development of a design. Design begins with a disjunction 
(KC), then involves concept developments (mainly CC), 
and ends with a conjunction (CK). These operators deal with 
some design reasoning. 
KC, CC, CK, and KK are the four operators used in 
CK theory. They were described in the previous section. CK 
theory is, however, not the only theory that introduces such 
types of operators.  
Two theories, inferential design theory and the inferential theory 
of learning, have introduced several operators related to 
knowledge transmutations [13] [12]. It seems that these theories 
describe the knowledge processing during the design process 
with a much higher level of accuracy. First, the organization of 
inferential design theory integrates several concepts present in 
traditional design theory. Inferential design theory considers the 
memory as a combination of a representation space, design 
goals, initial knowledge background knowledge, and new 
knowledge, and sees concept generation as an inference process 
in which these basic elements are processed via deduction, 
analogy, or induction. The results can be new knowledge and/or 
concepts. The theory also provides design knowledge 
transmutations which develop the initial processes of deduction, 
analogy, and induction. Eleven types of knowledge 
transmutation are developed in inferential design theory, such as 
replication/destruction, insertion/deletion, 
agglomeration/decomposition, association/disassociation, etc… 
We claim that the structure of knowledge developed in CK 
theory does not explicitly consider several transmutations that 
are present in inferential design theory. These transmutations 
appear to be useful in real design cases, as demonstrated by the 
TRIZ methodology [26] using several of these transmutation 
processes implicitly in order to solve design issues. CK theory 
seems not to consider them explicitly.  
Development of C 
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The creators of CK say that design begins by posing a problem 
to be solved. But they do not give any details on the design 
reasoning itself. In [2], they pose a concept of “keys easy to 
find”, but they do not explicitly describe in which manner this 
initial concept emerges. They basically do not consider 
engineering requirements and the structure and analysis 
resulting from this organized phase of the development process. 
It gives the impression that the creators of CK considered that 
none of the concepts and structures developed in engineering 
design in the past were worth integrating into their theory.   
Another issue may be the order in which we take into account 
the properties for the development of the tree of concepts. We 
did not find anything allowing the definition of an order of the 
properties of a concept. As a consequence, the uniqueness or 
non-uniqueness of the tree of concepts is not discussed in the 
theory. Nevertheless, the following examples show that they are 
important.  
Let us consider, for instance, a concept such as "there exists a 
product with properties P1, P2, P3 …" Then where should a 
new concept such as "There exists a product with properties P2 
and P4" appear? Obviously, this is not an expansion of {P1 and 
P2}. It could appear in a new branch of the tree of concepts, but 
in this case, the property P2 should be considered in two 
separate branches. Another example: "a blue machine that gives 
you energy and makes nice music when you caress it." Is this a 
blue machine that gives you energy to which we add the 
property "make nice music", or a machine making nice music to 
which we add the property blue and which gives you energy. 
These two definitions are strictly equivalent from a logical point 
of view but they will find different places in a hierarchy of 
concepts space as defined in C.  
This is a fundamental issue in the structure of CK theory.    
The first example states that even if no taxonomy is to be 
considered, a tree structure cannot be unique. The second 
example is typical of a consequence that the absence of a 
taxonomy can lead to, as it contains structural (blue), behavioral 
(making a nice sound …), and functional (gives you energy) 
parameters, as well as naming the object (machine).  
A tree of concepts cannot be represented simply when several 
classes of parameters are considered, and even if only one class 
of parameters is considered, such a concept tree cannot be 
unique. Possibly, if we could limit the "properties" to one single 
class of parameters, things could be clearer. Functional 
properties could be a good choice: this aspect is often treated 
rapidly in current design processes, even when steady methods 
such as functional analysis are used, and expanding the 
functions could help. 
In fact, the tree is built by the operations (inclusions and 
partitions). It represents the history of the construction of the 
concepts, and not a concept space. This appears as a limitation 
of CK theory. For us, this is incomprehensible because multi-
dimensional representations such as those used in 
morphological charts have proven their efficiency in searching 
for concepts by systematically linking different properties: these 
charts consider combinations.  
To sum up, the limitation to only two operations does not seem 
sufficiently justified and appears as a restrictive condition in the 
theory. We think that C could be expanded by inclusions, 
partitions, and also combinations.  
This point will have repercussions for the descriptive or 
prescriptive nature of CK theory.  
Switching from C to K: 
The operator C→K is poorly described. "Practically, it 
corresponds to validation tools or methods in classical design: 
consulting an expert, doing a test, an experimental plan, a 
prototype, a mock-up are common examples of C→K 
operators. They expand the available knowledge in K while 
being triggered by the concept expansion in C" [4] (p 9), and 
this operator can also lead to the end of the design process.  
But even this part of the design process is not predictable and is 
regularly peppered with "surprises" or unexpected findings, 
which are all new problems and/or opportunities.  
Such unexpected findings are not fully ignored in CK. "The 
necessity of expanding partitions in Design explains why 
Yoshikawa [23] finds “unexpected functions” for a “solution”" 
[4] (p 9). But we must highlight the fact that an unexpected 
discovery is not only a property the designer can choose to add 
to a concept, but might also be an emergent property of this 
concept, fundamentally linked to it (i.e. not independent). This 
emergence can hardly be interpreted as a contribution from the 
K domain. This is, for example, one of the key tenets of the 
system thinking approach in considering the emerging 
properties that might appear in a system. Moreover, its logical 
status is a "status under condition": it depends on the status the 
concept itself will or could get. On this point, links between 
concepts and pieces of knowledge appear to be much more 
intricate than the way in which CK considers them.   
In the eyes of CK theory, activities such as tests, product 
behavior models, prototyping, and experts, up to product 
development appear to be too simple and controlled processes 
aimed at validating the creative work made during concept 
generation: once you have found a concept, the design process 
can end (if the concept becomes knowledge, and if the product 
can be produced without surprise and with controlled processes) 
or continue with new generations of concepts. In practice, for 
engineers and product development what is seen as the end of 
the design process in CK is, in fact, just the beginning of their 
own design process. This aspect questions the real scope of CK 
relative to engineering design. 
4 SOME FORGOTTEN ASPECTS OF DESIGN 
In this part, after having discussed the foundations of CK 
theory, we would like to question the shadow zones of CK 
theory, to underline what seem to us to be unclear and missing 
aspects of the theory.  
4.1 Expandable rationality versus bounded 
rationality 
Hatchuel and his colleagues argue that CK theory allows us to 
"make operational the concept of "expandable rationality" 
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which is opposite to one of bounded rationality (...) Indeed, "the 
common vision of bounded rationality seems to enclose the 
rational reasoning in a space of constraints which delimits the 
rational reasoning strongly" [3]. This argument is, however, one 
possible misunderstanding of the concept of Simon, who does 
not consider knowledge, but the cognitive cost of action. 
Simon’s interest was in human decision-making and problem-
solving processes. He observed that decisions are not made in 
the way standard theory suggests, that is to say to choose a 
solution rationally from among existing alternatives, following 
well-defined criteria, and applying “substantive rationality” 
principles.  
He presented the rationality of action from the decision-making 
process leading to action. He therefore also rejected the idea of 
the omniscient decision maker (homo œconomicus) and 
promoted the concept of bounded rationality. 
The aim of Simon’s concept of bounded rationality is not to 
show that individuals or organizations are irrational in their 
assessments and decision-making processes. The concept of 
bounded rationality in fact underlines the cognitive constraints 
the designer has to cope with.  
Considering the bounded rationality [17] [18] means 
recognizing that even if the entire set of possible actions is 
theoretically given, it is not given in the practical sense because 
of the practical limitations of our computing resources 
(processing) to generate all possible actions and to compare 
them. 
Simon characterizes bounded rationality more positively and 
formally by the concepts of “search” and “satisficing”. His main 
idea is based on the “heuristic search hypothesis”, which stands 
that “problems are solved […] by searching selectively (i.e. 
heuristically) through a problem space (i.e. a problem 
representation)” [19]. The designer begins with the recognition 
of a need to act: create a new artifact that should satisfy a need 
or improve its satisfaction. The “search” for alternatives is 
initiated when the designer generates solutions. Lastly, a “stop 
rule” is required to end this costly cognitive process. “If 
alternatives can not be found that are satisfying, then aspiration 
levels will drop until an alternative is found” [20]. This last 
point leads Simon to conclude that “designing is satisfying if 
finding an acceptable solution” [19], which is more 
“reasonable” or satisfactory than optimal in the sense of rational 
choice theory.  
So, the so-called opposition between expandable rationality and 
bounded rationality is only apparent. It seems difficult for CK 
theory to accept the limits of human rationality. The expansion 
underlined by Hatchuel and Weil must be a bounded process.  
By taking into account the bounded rationality, we focus on the 
impossibility of an infinite expansion of the concepts (because 
of the inability to treat all information that arises, because of the 
limitations of cognitive abilities). Then, given the speed of 
production and codification of knowledge that characterize 
modern economies, today it is attention, not knowledge, which 
has become a scarce resource [21] (p.25). This question is not 
treated in CK theory. 
4.2 Design is also a social process! 
Extending CK theory by integrating the bounded rationality is 
not sufficient because, in this way, we are still centered on the 
design reasoning. The design reasoning masks the crucial 
question of the social dimension of the design process. 
Indeed, if Hatchuel and Weil [2] [4] assert that design is not 
only a mode of reasoning, one must note that they only 
considered the theory from the design reasoning perspective 
without considering the work division aspects and the evolution 
of organizational principles in design.  
Indeed, in CK theory, design is considered and analyzed at the 
designer level, and more precisely at the designer reasoning 
level. However, can a theory of design which presents itself as a 
unified design theory forget the collective dimension of design 
activity?  
Considering the collective dimension of design raises questions 
about the knowledge that designers bring to the K space, the 
variety of their knowledge, since resource heterogeneity 
provides a clear potential for creativity, and the cognitive 
distance between the actors, which determines their ability to 
cooperate effectively during the design reasoning. 
Moreover, we need a theory of design which goes far beyond 
the design reasoning and takes into account the cultural and 
historical dimensions too. This is due to the fact that cultural 
and historical dimensions have a strong influence on the 
possibility of design expansion. For example, Simonton [22], 
considering long periods of time, showed statistical correlations 
between the level of creativity and the following parameters: the 
type of society (democratic versus autocratic), the political 
context (war…), or the economic one (crisis, financial disposal, 
number of competitors). 
4.3 Design is also made of representations  
In many works, design is described as an activity based on the 
use of product representations: drawings, diagrams, models, 
mockups, and numerical representations such as CAD, virtual 
reality representations.  
The cognitive work done by designers to move from physical or 
numerical media to mental representations is important in 
design cognition.  
Fundamental issues concern the way designers can express and 
develop their ideas through the use of representations and 
representation tools.  
This point is certainly not critical, since many other design 
models, and nearly all the engineering models of designing, 
never consider representations and their linkage with reasoning. 
Moreover, an article by Tsoukias & Kazakci considers such a 
linkage from the concepts of the cognitive worlds of J. Gero 
[25]. 
This article points out that the design process can progress only 
if we introduce a third element, which they name the external 
representation, to the C and K space. Tsoukias & Kazakci claim 
that “the external representations and their reinterpretations are 
the main engines through which the design process progresses”. 
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Design representation and the designers are external entities to 
the object to be designed. They are situated in its environment 
and the environment should be represented in order to allow the 
acquisition of knowledge.  
Moreover, the problems of cognitive costs are heightened in 
situations of collaborative design and/or distributed design. The 
cognitive synchronization of the different actors takes time and 
resources, and organizational aspects are fundamental. 
As already presented in the previous section, the human 
dimension is absent from CK theory because in the theory this 
dimension is reduced to the reasoning aspects. 
4.4 What about the falsifiability of CK? 
If the previous sections point out some forgotten aspects of 
design, in this section we would like to consider CK theory 
from its epistemological foundations, that is to say its 
consistency, its internal logic, and its falsifiability. Before 
considering these questions we must underline that, if some 
aspects of design are omitted, this cannot be an argument for the 
refutation of a theory. Each theory is a model of reality based on 
a representation of that reality. The word theory is derived from 
the ancient Greek theoria, which originally meant "looking at, 
viewing, beholding," but in philosophy the term specifically 
came to refer to contemplation or speculation, often based on 
observation or experience, providing an ideal representation, 
isolated from applications. 
What must be considered is its internal coherence as claimed by 
the following definition:  
a theory is a set of propositions serving to unify logical 
concepts in order to explain or interpret some aspects of reality.  
According to these definitions, CK can be considered as a 
theory, and is constructed as such by the development of its 
basic axioms [4]. Its components are defined, axioms are given, 
and there are demonstrations of theorems. The internal 
coherence is good, and, if we have highlighted some shadow 
areas, this is not sufficient to attack CK on this point.  
CK appears a very inclusive and comprehensive theory. At this 
level of abstraction it is unusual for construction defects to 
appear. No logical problems seem to exist at this level, except 
maybe on one point. The structure of knowledge and concepts 
are defined through their analogy with forcing theory. We 
suggested that a structure of knowledge and concepts organized 
in the form of an ontology should avoid types of logical 
problems such as those described in Section 3.3 (the example of 
the blue machine, where the structural description of knowledge 
and concept can lead to three different descriptions of a single 
concept). In CK theory some clarifications can be provided on a 
few points. A definition of what is called "property", a 
clarification of the structure (or its absence) in the knowledge 
space and of the "status under conditions" should help. New 
links between concepts and knowledge could also be added in 
order to account for the unexpected discoveries that we 
mentioned earlier. As logical propositions in K cannot be 
supposed to be independent of the concept(s) that generated 
them, their possible transposition to other concepts is 
questioned. 
 
If the internal coherence of CK theory is is given a good deal of 
consideration by its creators, its falsifiable character is unclear. 
This criterion, introduced by Karl Popper, makes a distinction 
between theories in general and scientific ones. If CK theory 
happened to be irrefutable, this could strongly limit its interest 
and the scope of the scientific method. 
What the means developed by the creators of CK theory to test 
the theory are is a question which remains open.  
The founders of the theory should answer such questions and 
clearly provide such a type of study in order to clear the 
persistent and documented doubts about the real applicability of 
the approach.  
4.5 How can the design process be assisted? 
The capacity to assist the designer is another unclear dimension 
of CK theory. According to Hatchuel and his colleagues, CK 
theory is able to direct and guide the design process and thus 
the innovation process, which does not mean that the result of 
the design process can be known.  
However, in our study we did not find any proof about the 
ability of the theory to control and guide the innovation process 
effectively.  
Examples of applications of CK theory are given by the creators 
of the theory, but they are very general, and usually lack a 
description related to the context of the study and the type of 
cognitive mechanisms used by the designers to ensure that an 
innovative result is really the result of the use of CK theory.  
Yet even here, the question is that the dependencies between 
concepts (the tree) do indicate an effect of path dependency, as 
stated in Section 3.3. However, we have emphasized repeatedly 
the lack of criteria for deciding on the action to be taken at a 
given time. This was the case for deciding the order in which 
properties are related to an initial concept or for the way a 
concept must be built (from which pieces of knowledge and 
when?). This is also the case from a process point of view for 
the type of evolution one should give to the concept tree: is it 
preferably pertinent to make an inclusion, a restrictive partition, 
or an expansive partition or to attempt to force a conjunction, 
or, given the fact that the concept tree cannot be unique, to 
favor a peculiar branch, or to change its structure? 
The theory does not provide any guidance for answering such 
types of practical design questions.  
In addition, CK cannot help in guiding the choice between 
deriving new concepts by changing the need or requirements, 
changing its architecture, combining new functions, or changing 
a product feature. It does not state, either, if we should push the 
analysis in the field of knowledge (K). CK does not help us to 
know which new knowledge is useful for a specific 
development. There is no mechanism described in CK to know 
if one should develop further knowledge in a specific area. 
Without any specification of such choice criteria in the design 
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strategy, it might be possible to consider the claims of the 
creators of the theory that it guides the process as excessive.  
We are clear on this point; either CK claims a simple 
representation of effective design processes, and, in this case, it 
can at best be descriptive, or it claims control of the cognitive 
process, which, in our opinion, is not tenable, because then 
there is no criterion for the choice of the construction process 
defined in the theory.  A potential useful use of CK might be the 
recording of a design process. Nevertheless, its creators have 
not claimed this type of use for their theories. In addition, the 
structural limitations of the theory highlighted above make the 
theory difficult to use for this purpose. 
4.6 Process stages 
There are many works on the design process, in particular 
Systematic Design, developed in Germany, the USA, or Japan. 
Although these works are well known and quoted [15] [24] 
[23], the creators of CK theory quote these works but do not 
include the several theoretical concepts used in these 
approaches in their theory. These aspects were developed in 
Section 3.2. 
 
As we noted at the beginning of this paper, CK is an original 
formalism of the design reasoning used in I (Innovation) and 
leads us to suppose that there is no conjunction in D 
(Development) and no disjunction in R (Research). In this case 
D is then defined as problem solving; that is to say, according to 
CK theory, it is an exploration process which consists of the 
generation of a short list of possible solutions. 
CK is a theory of the function I in Research Innovation 
Development (RID) in the model presented by Le Masson et al. 
[2]. This raises the question of the real contribution of CK to 
design and might explain why this theory seems to ignore the 
engineering design work in its complexity and beauty. 
CK appears to be usable very early on in the innovation process 
since it concerns concept generation. New concepts seem close 
to new products, and the examples given in CK papers are, 
nearly systematically, examples where new functions and/or 
new uses are put together in a sort of functional synthesis that 
sometimes leads to radical functional shifts (e.g. from the initial 
need to develop a new smart shopping cart, the result is either a 
proposition to develop new interfaces between the user and the 
supermarket or the redesign of a smart supermarket [10]). 
Distinctions between process innovations, problem solving, or 
product improvement (e.g. incremental or radical) do not seem 
to be explicitly considered in the CK framework. In addition, it 
seems that no internal concepts in CK theory seem to 
specifically consider these aspects of innovation.  
After the concept generation (e.g. in the "downstream" steps of 
a design process), there is often a need for real technical 
creativity, and there is no doubt that this can also be considered 
as a design activity. Using the CK vocabulary, this creativity is 
often the condition to ensure the transition from a concept (i.e. 
with no evidence that this concept can become knowledge) to a 
definition and validation of the operating principles for a 
product. Further, the downstream steps such as embodiment and 
detailed design are also not discussed in the theory. 
Moreover, the theory does not address the rules for stopping the 
design process, named in the previous sections as a "satisfying 
solution". One indicator for this claim is certainly the absence 
of any complete product description for the examples given: 
except for the nail holder, the results are often reduced to 
principles that are never implemented. As explained above, this 
is one major difference from Simon, who proposed an algorithm 
for stopping the design process on the basis of a level of 
requirements [18].  
There is probably a difficulty here as a result of the definition of 
the "perimeter" of design. If we commonly agree that design 
involves creativity, we also consider that the engineering design 
process ends with a complete description of the product. These 
activities should be addressed in a design theory. The 
impression is that CK is reduced to the conceptual phase of the 
design process, but, nevertheless, innovation also takes place 
during the later phases of the development process.  
.  
5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
This paper underlines that CK is built as a theory, and that no 
fundamental logical defects have been found. Critics may be 
opposed to the choices Hatchuel and his colleagues made. But 
design science is an area where theoretical models of design are 
rare, even (almost) absent (SLM, AD), and a new theory is to be 
appreciated. Moreover, CK allows design to be distinguished 
from analytical reasoning. 
The theory offers an interesting distinction between concepts 
and knowledge. It is often recognized and affirmed that 
knowledge interacts with the design process, but there is no 
model that takes this interaction into account explicitly. This is 
the case with CK theory. In this respect too, the theory seems 
unique. Nevertheless, the definition of concepts and knowledge 
as logical propositions can be restrictive and a question exists as 
to their real practical applicability. Moreover, it appears that 
concepts and knowledge could be more intricate than what CK 
considers. A taxonomy could help at this level. 
The operators set for the development of the concept tree also 
seem to be restricted compared to the knowledge transmutation 
operators set by inferential design theory [12] [13], a theory 
anterior to CK, never quoted, but to which CK bears numerous 
similarities. Idea generation (ideation) seems complex and 
diverse, but here again, a restricted theory is better than no 
theory at all. 
The theory allows the tree of concept developments to be 
followed. This seems quite a practical tool to trace back and 
record the process of designing. But is it sufficient to control 
the process, and to direct it? The existence of (transmutation) 
operators that are not taken into account and the non-uniqueness 
of the tree of concepts are arguments against the control claim. 
And the absence of criteria for the choice of the construction 
process (which operator to choose and which strategy?) is a 
strong argument against the claim that the theory directs the 
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innovation process. In our opinion, the theory offers a simple 
(but not necessarily complete) representation of design 
processes and in this case, it can be at best a descriptive theory 
of the interaction between knowledge and the early design 
stage. No proof was found for verifying the ability of the theory 
to be prescriptive and to be able to control the innovation 
process.  
The last point that we have highlighted in this paper is the 
limited scope of the theory.  
CK does not try to integrate the previous research progress 
made in design science. Most of the fundamental concepts used, 
such as architecture or functions, are simply ignored. Social 
aspects, too, are not considered. When claiming that CK covers 
the whole design and innovation process, its creators clearly 
overestimate the real scope of their theory, which, finally, 
appears limited to the first ideation stages. As such, this is not a 
problem as far as the scope of the theory is clearly established. 
But this limited scope leads to questions about the real impact 
of the theory on engineering design.  
Finally, the criticisms we make of CK theory, especially the 
very general level of the theory and its probably limited scope, 
could be seen as justifications for its rejection. But this is not 
our opinion. CK offers an opportunity to discuss concepts; the 
critics highlight specificities of the very early phases of design 
compared to other product development phases. In this respect 
its formal language can be used to better grasp the specificity of 
the early design processes.  
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